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PARTITIONING AND RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT‘S ACCIDENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
JAMES A. GARDNER*
ABSTRACT
In democracies that allocate to a court responsibility for interpreting and enforcing
the constitutional ground rules of democratic politics, the sheer importance of the task
would seem to oblige such courts to guide their rulings by developing an account of the
nature and prominent features of the constitutional commitment to democracy. The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, has from the beginning refused to develop a general account—a
theory—of how the U.S. Constitution establishes and structures democratic politics. The
Court’s diffidence left a vacuum at the heart of its constitutional jurisprudence of democratic process, and like most vacuums, this one was almost immediately occupied. But the
Court filled its jurisprudential hole not primarily by invoking principles of democracy —
even unstated ones—but by doing instead what reluctant decision makers often do: by
reaching for whatever is handy. In a path-dependent series of small but fateful steps, the
Court’s reaction took two main forms. First, in the absence of a pertinent theory to guide
it, the Court fell back on habit, specifically a habit, developed in its earliest cases, of sol ving problems of political power and representation by partitioning the electorate—that is,
by ordering it subdivided. By resorting reflexively to this approach, the Court soon came
to treat partitioning as the preferred solution to most problems of democratic representation. Second, the Court reached for the tools of decision that were most ready at hand,
and those tools were individual rights, initially equal protection, then the freedoms of
speech and association. But because these tools were ill-suited to the task, the Court ended
up stretching First Amendment analysis in these cases beyond its plausible bounds and
purposes. A well-ordered democratic state needs a thoughtful and deliberate jurisprudence of democracy and democratic practice. Instead, the Court has provided an accidental, haphazard jurisprudence of habit and availability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If the main function of a constitution is to set the ground rules by
which a polity governs itself,1 then in constitutional democracies
* Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law
School, The State University of New York. An earlier version of this paper was presented
at a workshop on Electoral Law: The Virtuous or Vicious Circle of Theory and Practice, at
McGill University Law School, Montreal, Quebec, November 19, 2013. I wish to thank the
organizers, Hoi Kong, Han Ru Zhou, and Maxime St.Hilaire, for their kind hospitality. My
thanks also to Guy Charles and Michael Halberstam for comments on a prior draft, and to
Andrew DeMasters for valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. X (Richard H.
Cox, ed. 1982) (1690) (describing how members of a civil society create a form of government). For a more contemporary account, see RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM,
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surely the most significant ground rules are those structuring democratic politics. These are the rules that establish the basic framework
within which social disagreements are resolved, the processes by
which binding agreements are negotiated, and the criteria by which
such resolutions are to be deemed legitimate by those of whom submission to official power is demanded.2
In polities that, like the United States, allocate to a court responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the constitutional ground rules
of democratic politics, the sheer importance of the task would seem to
oblige such courts, when adjudicating disputes over basic democratic
processes, to guide their rulings by developing an account of the nature and prominent features of the constitutional commitment to democracy. The very definition of a constitution is sometimes said to
include not only the constitutional text, but also a ―nation‘s . . . dominant political theories.‖3 It is widely agreed that courts cannot in
practice decide constitutional cases involving regulation of the democratic process without resort to some underlying theory of democratic
politics—―engagement with structural theories in election law is inescapable.‖4 As Heather Gerken has explained in the context of redistricting, ―[c]ourts cannot decide whether power has been ‗fairly‘ or
‗properly‘ allocated among voters without having a broader theory of
how a healthy democracy should function . . . .‖5 The high courts of
other nations have not shrunk from developing such accounts, or at
least from making a serious attempt.6
CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140 (1999) (describing constitutions as pragmatically necessary means of social coordination).
2. In Peter Ordeshook‘s words, ―constitutions define the structure of the ‗normally‘
functioning state.‖ PETER C. ORDESHOOK, Some Rules of Constitutional Design, in
LIBERALISM AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 205 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993).
3. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A
JUST POLITICAL ORDER 13 (2007).
4. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1126
(2005). To similar effect, see Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan
Gerrymandering and a Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1097, 1099 (2007) (―Structural understanding is a necessary predicate to developing the
law of democracy . . . .‖); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 521 (2004); Richard H.
Pildes, Two Conceptions of Rights in Cases Involving Political ―Rights,‖ 34 HOUS. L. REV.
323, 324 (1997) (courts must have ―some conception of what politics ought to be‖); Yasmin
Dawood, Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights Approach to
Judicial Review, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 519-23 (2012) (arguing that even judicial reliance on specific, textual individual democratic rights cannot be accomplished satisfactorily
without some kind of theory of the democratic institutions and processes that give the right
meaning within the setting of a specific system of democratic governance).
5. Gerken, supra note 4, at 521.
6. For example, according to Yasmin Dawood, the Supreme Court of Canada ―has
played an important role in defining Canadian democracy.‖ Yasmin Dawood, Democracy
and the Right to Vote: Rethinking Democratic Rights under the Charter, 51 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 251, 253 (2013). The Australian High Court has inferred a freedom of political speech
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Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has long refused to develop a
general account of how the U.S. Constitution establishes and structures the democratic politics occurring within the very institutions
that the Constitution itself creates: ―Members of every generation of
the Supreme Court‘s Justices have claimed that they have no theory
about the way democracy should work.‖7 Until the mid-twentieth century, this refusal had few consequences because the Court did not understand its power to extend to policing the operation of democratic
institutions.8 In the Court‘s view, the Constitution did not subject
democratic politics to judicially enforceable constitutional meta-rules,
and for judges to attempt to find them in the Constitution exceeded the
legitimate bounds of the judicial role by asking them not to apply law,
but ―to choose . . . among competing theories of political philosophy.‖9
By 1962, however, the Court changed its view of its own powers,
and began to intervene regularly—and with increasing impact—in
the business of deciding the ground rules of democratic politics.10 At
the same time, the Court continued to refuse to develop an account of
the constitutionally grounded structure of democratic processes. As a
result, the Court has over the last five decades decided cases substantially reshaping the political landscape—eliminating restrictions
on voting,11 overturning long-established institutions of political representation,12 and invalidating regulatory limits on political speech
and spending13—largely without a compass.
from sections of the Australian Constitution dealing with representative and responsible
government. See Nationwide News Ltd. v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.); Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (Austl.).
7. Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen’s and
Richard Briffault’s Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 414 (2001). See also
Gerken, supra note 4, at 514; Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of
Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS (David K. Ryden, ed. 2000).
8. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Among
members of the contemporary Court, Justice Thomas has most explicitly expressed a similar sentiment: ―[M]atters of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere of federal judges. And that is precisely the point. The matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote
dilution cases are questions of political philosophy, not questions of law.‖ Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. The pivotal case was Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This history is elaborated
infra Part II.
11. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
12. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club‘s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011);
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm‘n, 514
U.S. 334 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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Scholars have advanced several possible explanations for the
Court‘s surprising reticence. It has been suggested, for example, that
the Court avoids attempting to tease out of the Constitution some
plausible baseline theory of how American democratic politics ought
to work because the issues are so ―hard to figure out‖14 that the task
may surpass judicial competence.15 Others argue that judicial development of such a theory is properly avoided because the Constitution‘s indeterminacy on the subject of democratic practices raises unacceptable risks that courts might improperly ossify contingent political arrangements that are best left fluid, or that judges might rely
excessively on their personal views of what democracy requires.16 Another family of explanations proposes the Court‘s embrace of a minimalist approach to judging17 or the justices‘ preference for highly specific doctrinal formulae couched at low levels of abstraction.18
Although there may be a grain of truth to all these explanations,
in the end they give the Court more credit than it deserves. A close
and careful look at the precise sequence in which the Court‘s jurisprudence of democratic process evolved tells a different story, one
distinctly less appealing on account of the almost complete absence
from the Court‘s decision making of deliberate judicial choice and reflection. What this history shows is not the application of some consistent and coherent judicial philosophy or practice of judging; to the
contrary, it shows that the Court‘s jurisprudence of democracy arrived at its present unsatisfactory state accidentally, by way of a
path-dependent sequence of small yet fateful steps.
Specifically, the Court‘s lack of a theory of democratic politics in
its earliest cases left a vacuum at the heart of the constitutional jurisprudence of democratic process. Like nature, however, jurisprudence abhors a vacuum; cases must be decided somehow, on some
basis, if decisions are to be taken. I argue here that the Court filled
its jurisprudential hole not primarily by invoking principles of democracy–even unstated ones19–or by invoking and following consistently some set of beliefs about the modest role of courts in a democra14. See Gerken, supra note 4, at 508; Gerken, supra note 7, at 421.
15. See Kang, supra note 4, at 1099-100; Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 302.
16. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 71-72, 139, 153-54 (2003); Lowenstein,
supra note 7; Luke P. McLoughlin, The Elysian Foundations of Election Law, 82 TEMP. L.
REV. 89, 115-16 (2009).
17. See Kang, supra note 4, at 1105. On the risks of judicial grand theory, see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
18. See Gerken, supra note 7, at 421-22.
19. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 4, at 1114; Gerken, supra note 7, at 414; Kang, supra
note 4, at 1113 (all arguing that it is impossible for courts to decide cases dealing with
democratic processes without orienting themselves against some underlying conception of
democracy, which is thus necessarily present even if unarticulated).
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cy. Instead, the Court responded to questions about democratic process raised in its cases by doing what reluctant decision makers often
do: by reaching for whatever is handy.20 This reaction took two main
forms. First, in the absence of a pertinent theory to guide it, the
Court fell back on habit. Its principal relevant habit, developed in its
earliest cases dealing with democratic practices, had been to solve
problems of political power and representation by partitioning the
electorate—that is, by ordering it subdivided, thereby converting minorities within a jurisdiction into local majorities in a smaller one. By
resorting to this habit in subsequent cases, the Court soon came to
treat partitioning as the preferred solution to most problems of democratic representation, even where it might be of dubious wisdom.
Second, the Court reached for the tools of decision that were most
ready at hand, and those tools were individual rights. In particular,
the Court unthinkingly imported an antidiscrimination approach,
pioneered in cases involving racial discrimination and relying on
principles of equal protection, into a large number of disputes dealing
with democratic process, problems for which this approach often was
not well-suited.21 Later, when the Equal Protection Clause began to
prove inadequate to the increasingly complex task of regulating political processes, the Court began, reflexively, to import other rights
into the democracy arena, principally the First Amendment protections of speech and association, which it proceeded to stretch badly by
applying them in circumstances for which they were not designed. As
a result, the Court has developed what might plausibly be called a
jurisprudence of habit and availability when it should have developed
a jurisprudence of democracy and democratic practice.
How the Court reached this point is the story I wish to relate. It
begins not with modern, frustratingly complex conceptual problems
of campaign speech and finance, but with very old problems of brute,
physical territoriality arising from the way human beings distribute
themselves on the land. Part I therefore reviews briefly the historical
evolution of the American system of territorial representation,
demonstrating how a set of institutions initially well-matched to pre20. This behavioral trait is sometimes referred to as an ―availability heuristic.‖ See
AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11-14 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207 (1973).
21. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1216 (1996) (―[T]he Court . . . has . . . created a doctrinal morass by
selectively wrenching concepts out of the contexts in which they were developed and attempting to jury-rig them to work in a context where they do not make sense . . . .‖); Samuel Issacharoff and & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705-06 (1999) (the Court‘s practices have ―led to the recasting of essentially political challenges born of electoral frustration as racial ones‖).
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vailing political theories and practices came increasingly under pressure as social and political beliefs evolved. Part II examines the U.S.
Supreme Court‘s entry onto this terrain in its early decisions reviewing the constitutionality of laws regulating democratic representation. Paying careful attention to the kinds of cases coming before the
Court and their precise sequence, Part II shows how the Court‘s earliest rulings, in cases involving racial discrimination in politics, established a template for judicial intervention that the Court, in pathdependent fashion, almost immediately applied in other, far less propitious settings.
Part III describes the quick emergence and solidification of the
Court‘s preference for solving problems of democratic representation
by partitioning the electorate so as to transform complaining political
minorities into content, locally dominant majorities. It argues that
the Court‘s habitual and unthinking reliance on partitioning, unmoored to any normative conception of who ought to be represented
in legislative bodies or their appropriate degree of influence, led predictably to the emergence of one of the most intractable problems in
contemporary American politics: the Court‘s complete inability to adjudicate successfully questions of partisan gerrymandering.
Finally, Part IV examines the Court‘s unguided deployment of generic individual rights to solve problems of democratic process and
participation, following the Court‘s jurisprudence step by step from
an initial reliance on equal protection to its expansion into First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association. Part IV shows how
reliance on principles of equal protection, which had served the Court
well in its early cases involving racial discrimination in politics, began to cause the Court mounting problems, leading it to turn to the
freedom of speech, where it ran into even more severe and less tractable problems. Ultimately, constrained by a series of path-dependent
decisions into penetrating ever more deeply into the use of individual
rights—a commitment from which it apparently saw no possible retreat—the Court has continued to press First Amendment rights into
service to a point well beyond the bounds of logic or necessity, a widely criticized pattern that continues to this day.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION
American institutions of political representation have their roots
in an English system designed initially to represent land.22 Land22. The argument in this section relies on findings and analysis first set out in James
A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community [hereinafter
One Person, One Vote], 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237 (2002), and James A. Gardner, Representation
Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering
[hereinafter Representation Without Party], 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (2006).
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holders in feudal England held their estates under an obligation to
provide various forms of aid to the crown, including, upon request,
financial assistance.23 Because financial impositions by tradition
could not be assessed without the consent of those tenured in the
lord‘s land, representatives of the land were summoned to Parliament for the purpose of giving their consent to taxation.24
As the rise of commerce expanded the potential sources of wealth
beyond land, English monarchs sought to tap these new sources of
royal revenue by expanding Parliament to include representatives
from corporate towns and boroughs, where merchant wealth was
mainly to be found.25 Nevertheless, representation in Parliament continued to be based on the unit from which consent was required, irrespective of its actual characteristics, including who or how many
happened to live there, or even the amount of revenue due from the
taxable unit.26 By the late fourteenth century, representatives in Parliament consisted of two knights from each county and two citizens or
burgesses from each city or borough within the represented counties,
regardless of population, wealth, or property value.27
This model eventually crossed the Atlantic to the American colonies, where representation in colonial legislatures was allocated not to
individuals, but to local communities. Thus, in Massachusetts, representatives represented towns; in Virginia, plantations, hundreds or
counties; and in the Carolinas, parishes.28 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said in 1811, ―[t]he right of sending representatives [to the state legislature] is corporate, vested in the town . . . .‖29
By the time this method of representation became entrenched in the
colonies, however, its justification had evolved from one based on feudal obligations in land to a more characteristically republican justification that presupposed a commonality of interest arising from shared
characteristics of the inhabitants of represented units:
The corporate method of representation presumed that physical
proximity generated communal sentiment. Each geographic unit
was thought to be an organic, cohesive community, whose resi23. See M.V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 253 (1964).
24. See G.L. HARRISS, The Formation of Parliament, 1272-1377, in THE ENGLISH
PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 41 (R.G. Davies & J.H. Denton eds., 1981); WILLIAM
STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
199-202 (1880).
25. See A.F. POLLARD, THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 51-55 (1920); STUBBS, supra
note 24, at 210.
26. For a thorough discussion of medieval taxation policies, see G.L. HARRISS, KING,
PARLIAMENT, AND PUBLIC FINANCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND TO 1369 (1975).
27. See A.L. Brown, Parliament, c. 1377-1422, in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 117-18 (R.G. Davies & J.H. Denton eds., 1981).
28. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 41 (1988).
29. In re Opinion of the Justices, 7 Mass. 523, 526 (1811).
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dents knew one another, held common values, and shared compatible economic interests. The smaller the community, the more likely that its citizens would identify with one another . . . . Large distances, in contrast, bred a diversity of peoples and values.30

By the time of the Revolution, the founding generation fully accepted this account of representation. The idea that the political interests of communal groups of individuals correlated strongly with
territory served, for example, as an axiom in Madison‘s famous defense of the large republic in Federalist 10.31 ―Factious combinations,‖
Madison argued, are ―less to be dreaded‖ in a large republic than in a
small one because of the greater variety of interests found among a
larger populace, a characteristic that is entirely an artifact of geographical scale: ―Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of
the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens . . . .‖32 The idea that territorially defined local communities
may reliably serve as proxies for the shared, collective interests of
the individuals who inhabit them has remained a fixture in American
political thought ever since.33 So, for example, among delegates to the
Wisconsin constitutional convention of 1851, ―[t]he leading idea
seems to have been that each county was regarded in the nature of ‗a
small republic,‘ or ‗in the light of a family,‘ and ‗each organized county had a separate interest.‘ ‖34 In its more modern incarnation, the
belief that place and interest coincide centers on the idea of the
―community of interest,‖ a term widely used in federal reapportionment jurisprudence.35
Nevertheless, it is not immediately self-evident why the inhabitants of any particular locality should comprise a community of interest. Why should mere common habitation of a unit of local government reflect, or give rise to, a community of interest among the residents? The answer to this question was gradually worked out by
American state courts, which typically offered two distinct, though
not unrelated theories. First, the inhabitants of a county or similar
30. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1776-1850 (1987), at 37-38. See also ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF
CONSTITUENCY:
POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION,
DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY,
AND
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 72-77 (2005).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
32. Id.
33. For a strong critique of this phenomenon, see THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 4-8 (1978).
34. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 739 (Wis. 1892) (Pinney, J., concurring), (quoting JOURNAL OF DEBATES 219-24 (1851)).
35. E.g., Lawyer v. Dep‘t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 919 (1995); Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998).

2014]

PARTITIONING AND RIGHTS

69

local government unit were said to share a common local economy
and economic life; second, county residents were said to participate
together in the public life of a shared unit of political and governmental administration.36
The linkage in the state constitutional jurisprudence between
counties as the basic constitutional unit of representation and the
shared economic life of county residents has never been expressed
more clearly than in a 1964 opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Anciently, and still today, the counties reflect different economic
interests, although of course these economic interests are not perfectly contained or separated by any political line, municipal,
county or State. So, certain counties have a dominant concern
with manufacturing and commerce; others have a large stake in
agriculture; still others lean heavily upon the resort industry;
and finally a few counties have a special interest in the products
of the sea.37

The idea here, clearly, is that counties are not arbitrary territorial
units, random shapes on a map, to be ignored or rearranged on a
whim, but rather contain populations that have distinctive interests,
and these interests are primarily economic; each county, that is to
say, comprises a distinct local economy.
At the same time, American state courts also have frequently
found that residency in a county creates what might be called an
―administrative‖ community of interest among the inhabitants in virtue of their common experience of the county‘s administration of governmental programs.38 Finally, state courts have sometimes found
that common participation by a county‘s inhabitants in its electoral
politics, and in the reciprocal relationships established between those
inhabitants and their elected officials, gives rise to a political community of interest entitled to recognition.39
For much of American history the activities of state legislatures
conformed largely to this model. During the colonial period, the matters that individual legislators brought to state legislature were ―basically the business of their fellow townsmen,‖ and the legislative

36. This argument is worked out in greater detail in Gardner, Representation without
Party, supra note 22, at 939.
37. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964).
38. On the role of counties in state government, see, for example, In re Legislative
Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 319 (Md. 2002), and Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562
S.E.2d 377, 385-86 (N.C. 2002).
39. See, e.g., Stephenson, 562 S.E.2d at 386; Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 110 (Va.
2002); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor and W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 330 (Vt. 1993).
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agenda was set essentially by petitions from towns and individuals.40
This changed surprisingly little over the course of the nineteenth
century. During much of that period, state legislatures ―spent most of
their time responding to highly specialized demands like divorces or
the settlement of local disputes and land titles.‖41 In mid-nineteenthcentury Maryland, for example, no more than ten percent of state
legislation took up matters affecting the entire polity, whereas more
than half of state laws affected only specific local communities and
groups, and one-third provided some kind of benefit to specific individuals.42 Legislative politics was thus conceived primarily as an arena for satisfying demands made by communities and individuals, not
as one for taking up universally applicable programmatic initiatives,
much less for adjudicating among competing conceptions of collective
life or governance.
The point of all this is to suggest that until at least the early
twentieth century American political institutions and prevailing theories of politics suited each other rather well, reflecting a largely republican set of political beliefs implemented by largely compatible
institutions. In this environment, where representatives were understood to represent territorially-defined interests, most problems with
representation could therefore be solved by territorial partitioning of
the electorate. For example, one of the most common complaints
about inadequate representation during the nineteenth century arose
from westward migration: the appearance of newly settled communities gave rise to demands for formal legal recognition and the legislative representation that came with it.43 Legislative carving of a new
town or county from previously recognized territorial communities
thus provided a complete and appropriate solution to the problem:
newly-formed communities entitled to legislative representation
achieved the recognition they were due, and the new town or county
could then become a player in the competitive processes of obtaining
central legislative favors and gaining access to centrally controlled
resources.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the
ground began to shift. First, traditionally republican conceptions of
40. MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 35 (1970).
41. CHARLES A. KROMKOWSKI, RECREATING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: RULES OF
APPORTIONMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT,
1700–1870 (2002), at 363. For similar data, see J. MILLS THORNTON III, POLITICS AND
POWER IN A SLAVE SOCIETY ALABAMA, 1800–1860 (1978), at 85-86, and Gerald
Gamm & Thad Kousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical Patterns in American State Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151 (2010).
42. See JEAN H. BAKER, AMBIVALENT AMERICANS: THE KNOW-NOTHING PARTY IN
MARYLAND 94 (1977).
43. See Gardner, Representation without Party, supra note 22, at 892.
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politics began to be displaced by increasingly influential utilitarian
theories.44 Unlike traditional republicanism, which presupposed organic and enduring linkages between place, community, and interest,
utilitarianism argued that interests were both individual and highly
contingent, and therefore unpredictable.45 What pleased a person was
a matter of personal taste, and a person‘s taste was a priori no more
likely to be satisfied by one thing than by another.46 Place and community were thus knocked off their pedestal and demoted to a level of
equality with all other potential consumption values. In politics, this
meant that the political cleavages that individuals found most salient
could just as easily revolve around occupation, social class, ideology,
clan, or any of a host of other factors, as around the traditional center
of gravity of local community.
By the mid-twentieth century, political scientists had appropriated this new understanding by constructing influential and distinctly anti-republican models of political pluralism.47 These models
rejected a conception of citizenship as revolving around the pursuit
of republican virtue and replaced it with one stressing the pursuit
of self-interest.48 By the same token, they also rejected a static conception of politics as jostling among fixed communities in favor of a
conception of politics as a fluid, constantly evolving competition
among shifting groups organized around contingently salient interests of the moment.49
The rise of Progressivism during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries launched a second kind of attack on traditional
republican institutions. Progressives argued that corruption in politics was pervasive; that the rich and powerful unduly dominated, for
their own benefit, the inherited institutions of politics; and that citi44. For a concrete example of the direct influence of John Stuart Mill‘s writings on the
members of a late-nineteenth-century state constitutional convention, see Commonwealth
v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
45. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1-7
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1781); John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in JOHN STUART MILL
ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 136 (John Gay ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1861).
46. In Bentham‘s famous formulation, the only distinction between ―push-pin . . . and
poetry‖ is the pleasure people happen to derive from them. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE
RATIONALE OF REWARD 206 (John & H.L. Hunt 1917) (1825). Accord BENTHAM, supra note
45, at 43-45.
47. See ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL
PRESSURES (The Principia Press, Inc. 1935); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY [hereinafter WHO GOVERNS?] (1975); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951).
48. This movement reached its apotheosis in ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
49. Dahl‘s detailed account of ―minorities rule‖ in municipal self-governance probably
makes this point as vividly as it has ever been made. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 47.
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zens, though retaining in theory the capacity to control existing institutions of government for the public good, had permitted themselves
to be distracted by objectively irrelevant distinctions of family,
neighborhood, and ethnicity.50 Progressives consequently mounted a
sustained attack on the inherited institutional structure, seeking to
replace existing institutions with others they believed more conducive to popular pursuit of rational self-governance in the public interest.51 This movement was in many respects extremely successful.
Progressives won widespread adoption of measures designed to make
voting more rational, such as the secret ballot and the short ballot; to
enhance popular control of government, such as primary elections,
initiatives, referenda, recall, direct election of U.S. Senators, and female suffrage; and to reduce the role of partisanship in governance,
such as the city manager and commission forms of local government,
nonpartisanship, and at-large elections.52 With the exception of direct
election of Senators and the extension of the vote to women, however,
all the significant institutional reforms occurred at the state and local levels; the institutions of democratic politics at the national level
remained firmly in place.
Lastly, by the mid-twentieth century, popular tolerance for racial
exclusions from democratic life waned substantially in most of the
country. The civil rights movement focused much of its effort on
breaking down racial barriers to voter registration and balloting,
achieving a modest initial success in the federal Civil Rights Act of
1957, followed by what would turn out to be a transformational victory in the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).53
All these developments—the eclipse of republicanism, the Progressive reform movement, and the evolution of attitudes concerning
race—created serious tensions in the political environment. Existing
institutions of democratic politics came increasingly to be seen as out
of step with, and inhospitable to, prevailing beliefs about democracy
and democratic practice. It was into this frothing cauldron that the
Supreme Court finally inserted itself.

50. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955);
WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE, THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH A VIEW OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1910); John D. Buenker, Sovereign Individuals and Organic Networks: Political Cultures
in Conflict During the Progressive Era, 40 AM. Q. 187, 188 (1988).
51. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 315-50 (1909); Buenker, supra
note 50, at 188.
52. See generally RICHARD S. CHILDS, CIVIC VICTORIES: THE STORY OF AN UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION (1952); BENJAMIN PARKE DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (Richard T.
Ely ed., Macmillan 1915); HOFSTADTER, supra note 50.
53. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63
(1988); GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT ENTERS THE FIELD
For a long time, the Supreme Court did not concern itself with
questions involving the structure or regulation of political practices.
For much of American history, opportunities for federal judicial intervention simply did not arise. Throughout the nineteenth century,
much of political life was left to private self-regulation. Political parties formed freely, selected candidates by processes of their own
choosing, printed their own ballots, and ran campaigns free from
governmental oversight.54 Such election law as existed was almost
entirely at the state level, making it a matter for state courts, not
federal ones.55 Indeed, the U.S. Constitution expressly grants to
states the authority to regulate federal congressional and presidential elections.56
The Supreme Court, moreover, had long taken the position that
democratic processes generally, and questions of political representation in particular, were not the business of the federal courts. In a
pivotal 1946 ruling, a plurality of the Court ruled malapportionment
a nonjusticiable political question, warned against judicial entry into
a ―political thicket,‖ and decreed that the only remedy for defects in
political representation lay in voluntary legislative action to correct
it.57 The entire panoply of Progressive reforms was implemented, after all, not by judicial intervention, but by legislative action taken in
the wake of a highly successful process of political mobilization.
Eventually, however, profound shifts in the social and political
environment produced tensions that became too much for the Court
to bear, and its resolve to stay out of democratic processes crumbled.
As I shall describe shortly, this occurred first in a limited way in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960),58 and then more broadly in Baker v.
Carr (1962),59 until by the time it decided Buckley v. Valeo (1976),60
the Court was not only heavily involved, but routinely altering the
political landscape. This pattern has only continued with decisions
such as Bush v. Gore (2000),61 Citizens United v. FEC (2010),62 and,
54. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MIDNINETEENTH CENTURY (2004); Peter H. Argersinger, ―A Place on the Ballot‖: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287 (1980).
55. This is still the case today: there is very little election law at the federal level
while comprehensive election codes exist in every state. See JAMES A. GARDNER & GUYURIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 90 (2012).
56. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. II, § 1.
57. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
58. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
59. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
60. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
61. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
62. 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010).
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most recently, Shelby County v. Holder (2013)63 and McCutcheon v.
FEC (2014).64
The Court‘s first significant ruling of the modern era in the field of
democratic process was Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960),65 a case that followed closely on the heels, both in time and in subject matter, of perhaps its most important ruling of the twentieth century, Brown v.
Board of Education (1954),66 in which the Court ordered an end to racial segregation in public schools. Gomillion concerned a law, enacted
by the Alabama Legislature at the request of the City of Tuskegee,
that altered the boundaries of the city from a perfect square to a meandering 28-sided polygon. After this boundary change, every white
resident of Tuskegee still lived within the city, while virtually all of its
black residents found themselves outside it.67 In a gnostic opinion that
laid out more clearly the justices‘ horror at this racial gerrymander
than their legal reasoning, the Court invalidated the law as an infringement of the right to vote on the basis of race in contravention of
the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.68
That Gomillion got things started turns out to have been unfortunate in a way; although the case established a template for adjudication that the Court has followed ever since, it is a template that turns
out not to be very useful outside the arena of naked racial discrimination. One way in which Gomillion got things off to a poor start is
that it involves political exclusion in the most literal sense—through
the drawing of boundaries to partition, and by partitioning to exclude
one portion of, the electorate. Although the case might have been
framed as raising questions about the practice of partitioning itself, it
was framed instead in a way that assumed the legitimacy of partitioning but treated this particular partition as illicit. As a result, the
Court was immediately cast in the role of policing the practice of partitioning the electorate, rather than examining the practice itself on
its merits, or inquiring into alternative ways to structure democratic
representation that might more directly address the problems of racial exclusion from democratic life.
This was especially unfortunate because the racial gerrymandering undertaken in Gomillion represented an extremely unusual form
of racial exclusion from democratic participation. Most forms of racebased political exclusion in the United States have not involved the
creation of formal geographical boundaries; they have involved in63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340-41.
See id. at 345.
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stead the application of law, force, and social pressure to exclude
members of an existing community from participating in that community‘s own democratic practices.69 They create, in other words, interior boundaries within a society, not reified, external boundaries
formally fencing out the disfavored populations.
Second, the gerrymander in Gomillion was undertaken only when
more common forms of racial exclusion and suppression had been
deemed unpromising. Tuskegee had been since 1881 the home of the
Tuskegee Institute (now Tuskegee University), which by the 1950s
was an unusually successful, well-regarded, and well-funded black
college.70 During that era, the typical method of first resort in the
American South to exclude blacks from participation in a community‘s political life was the literacy test.71 Testing literacy, however, did
not recommend itself as a way to exclude black voters associated with
the Tuskegee Institute, many of whom held a Ph.D., and were generally far better educated than the city‘s white population.72 The redrawing of the town‘s borders to move the Institute and its faculty,
staff, and students outside the town was thus an atypical measure of
some desperation. Additionally, unlike most other forms of political
and social exclusion of blacks, the boundary drawing was not only
readily observable, but susceptible essentially to res ipsa loquitur
proof of racial animus—no other plausible explanation could account
for it.73
Finally, the pattern established in Gomillion included deployment
of an individual right to solve a problem of democratic practice. The
Fifteenth Amendment was available, ready-at-hand, had previously
been used by the Court in a few earlier cases,74 and seemed tailormade for the kind of problem presented by the Tuskegee racial gerrymander. As a result, the Court gave no thought—and in fairness
really did not need to give any thought—to larger, more systemic

69. For innumerable examples, see BRANCH, supra note 53, and MAY, supra note 53.
70. For a brief history, see 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY 1067-68
(Leslie Alexander & Walter C. Rucker eds., 2010).
71. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 142, 144 (2000); MAY, supra note 53, at xi-xii.
72. See BERNARD TAPER, GOMILLION VERSUS LIGHTFOOT: THE TUSKEGEE
GERRYMANDER CASE 14, 62 (1962).
73. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (―If these allegations upon a
trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is
solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of
town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.‖).
74. These include the ―grandfather clause‖ cases and the ―white primary‖ cases. See
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see also
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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questions concerning appropriate patterns of representation and
democratic political life.
Despite the very unusual circumstances of Gomillion, the pattern
pioneered there was soon applied outside the setting of racial discrimination in a case that went a long way toward cementing it.75 In
Baker v. Carr (1962),76 decided just two years after Gomillion, the
Court took up the problem of legislative malapportionment, in which
legislative election districts contain grossly disparate numbers of voters. In a decision that changed the course of American democracy,
the Court reversed its earlier position and held that district population disparities present a justiciable question of constitutional law
under the Equal Protection Clause.77
Garden-variety malapportionment does not present problems of
either race or exclusion. Everyone in a malapportioned district is entitled to vote and to participate fully in politics, and may do so on an
equal footing with everyone else in the district.78 If malapportionment harms processes of political representation, it does so by operation of some defect other than outright exclusion. Upon taking up
this problem for the first time, the Court could have dealt with it by
deriving or advancing a constitutionally grounded theory of representation. It might have held, for instance, that malapportionment violates some aspect of the way popular sovereignty is meant to work. It
could have taken the position, on a kind of pluralist or agency view,
that malapportionment erects a barrier to some contemplated degree
of government responsiveness to public opinion. Or it might even
have invoked a more traditional, republican theory of disenfranchisement of communities, understood as territorially defined populations or as territorially defined interests of groups of co-residents.
Instead, the Court approached the problem of malapportionment
using the Gomillion model. It reached for the most readily available
tool—an individual right, the Equal Protection Clause79—thereby
forcing the case into the mold of an intervention designed to thwart
discrimination. But who was discriminating against whom? In the
Court‘s view, elaborated in later cases, the discrimination effectuated
by malapportionment was discrimination in favor of sparsely populated rural areas at the expense of densely populated urban ones.80
75. In this sense, the phenomenon I am describing may be conceived as a kind of pathdependence. See, e.g., Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of
Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251 (2000).
76. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
77. Id. at 226-37.
78. See id. at 335 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gerken, supra note 4, at 506-07.
79. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226, 232, 237.
80. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (―A citizen, a qualified voter, is no
more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm.‖). Although the Court never
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As in Gomillion, the Court again cast itself not as inquiring into the
propriety of partitioning of the electorate as a way of organizing political representation, but as policing the practice of partitioning, the
legitimacy of which was assumed, and the basis of which was not
examined.
Two years later, in the seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims (1964),81
the Court used the new, individual rights lever it identified in Baker
to effectuate perhaps the most sweeping change in American democratic practice since adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments following the conclusion of the Civil War. In Reynolds, the Court for the
first time applied the equal protection remedy identified in Baker to
the apportionment of state legislatures.82 In a far-reaching decision,
the Court held that population disparities among legislative districts
violated the right to vote of individuals in overpopulated districts,
and that a constitutionally mandated rule of one person, one vote applied to both houses of bicameral state legislatures.83
The impact of this decision cannot be overstated. At a stroke, it
placed a core feature of a historically decentralized system of representation under central control and destroyed the long-standing
structural framework instituting political representation on the basis of place and local community. After Reynolds, institutions formerly aimed at achieving representation of communities—of inhabited places—were required to be based instead on shifting, equipopulous groupings of placeless individuals. 84 The Court thus discarded the theory of representation that had long prevailed in the
states, not only invalidating it, but deeming it incompatible with
what the Court now announced to be constitutionally-grounded notions of equal citizenship.85
Although Reynolds precipitated wide-ranging and doubtless beneficial changes in the balance of political power across the nation,86 it
established a poor pattern for judicial involvement in the realm of
democratic practice.87 First, the Court did not advance any affirmative theory of political representation; its only theory was negative in
said so directly in any of its major malapportionment decisions, the idea of discrimination
by rural against urban areas of course has an implicitly racial valence, bringing it squarely
within the Court‘s emerging comfort zone.
81. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
82. Id. at 557.
83. See id. at 568-72.
84. See Gardner, One Person, One Vote, supra note 22, at 1238.
85. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-69.
86. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY:
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2009).
87. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions, Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899, 1945-46 (2006).
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the sense that certain practices—in fact, the old, prevailing practices—were invalid. Second, the Court‘s establishment of equal protection as the tool of choice outside the racial context, without a theory
of democratic practice and participation to guide its application, was
especially problematic. Equal protection outcomes tend to be parasitic on underlying substantive values.88 One cannot know whether a
person is being treated unequally in any way that counts without
first knowing whether that person has a substantive entitlement to
the thing he or she has been denied in equal measure, and whether a
person has such an entitlement is a question not of equality, but of
desert.89 By applying equal protection to democratic practices without
first specifying the underlying substantive values that are implicated
by democratic participation, the Court thus founded its democratic
jurisprudence on shifting and unstable ground.
In particular, as Justice Harlan pointed out in dissent, the Court
specified neither how much influence citizens should have in a democracy, nor even the outer parameters of what such influence might
reasonably be, nor yet any framework within which to think about
these questions.90 As a result, equal protection outcomes in democracy cases are consistent with a wide array of outcomes that cannot be
narrowed except by invoking some antecedent theory of democracy or
democratic authority.91 Unfortunately, the Court failed to specify
what that theory is—it did not indicate, in other words, the proper
baseline of comparison for deciding whether democratic influence has
been improperly and unequally withheld.92 This lacuna has ever since
confounded the coherence and utility of constitutional oversight of
the political process, and raised many problems that still plague the
jurisprudence.
The next two sections focus on two of the most notable problems
arising from the template for judicial intervention developed by the
Supreme Court in these early cases: its reflexive resort to partitioning of the electorate as a remedy for perceived democratic wrongs or
imperfections; and its unthinking deployment of an individual
rights model.
IV. PERFECTIBILITY THROUGH PARTITIONING
In cases involving democratic practice in which groups have been
excluded or mistreated, the Supreme Court has from the beginning of
88. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
89. See id. at 546-47.
90. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 620-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91. See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY
148-49 (1989).
92. See Gerken, supra note 4, at 507.
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its modern jurisprudence displayed a distinct preference for solutions
that rely on partitioning the jurisdiction over those that rely on enhancing participation and engagement within the jurisdiction. That
is, where members of some group complain that their desire to become full participants in the political life of their community has
been thwarted by some officially created obstacle, the Court has preferred not to dwell on ways in which the complaining group might be
more fully integrated into existing democratic structures and practices. Instead, it has tended to solve these problems by partitioning the
jurisdiction in such a way as to make the complaining minority into a
local majority.
An early, important, and in many ways typical example of this
approach is White v. Regester (1973).93 In Regester, black and Chicano
populations of two large, metropolitan counties in Texas complained
that they had been unconstitutionally excluded from effective participation in the congressional politics of their jurisdictions.94 The claim
involved many moving parts. The plaintiffs complained that they had
been victims of a long history of official discrimination in political
affairs; that local party processes of choosing candidates were controlled by whites who did not pay sufficient attention to minority
communities; that racially divisive campaign tactics had been deployed routinely in white areas; and that, in the case of the MexicanAmerican plaintiffs, cultural and language barriers and restrictive
voter registration practices significantly impeded their political effectiveness.95 In light of these background conditions, the plaintiffs focused their objections on a specific institutional choice made by the
state: its decision to use in these counties large, multimember congressional districts and a place system, in which all candidates ran
at-large for specific seats.96 Ultimately, the plaintiffs argued, the
combination of underlying discrimination and the specific institutional choice created conditions in which it was virtually impossible
for members of these groups to participate effectively in local congressional politics.97
The Court understood these claims perfectly, casting them as challenges to effective participation in democratic processes:
The plaintiffs‘ burden is to produce evidence to support findings
that the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in question–
that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

412 U.S. 755 (1973).
Id. at 767, 769.
Id. at 766-69.
Id.
Id. at 765, 769.
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the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.98

Relying on an examination of ―the totality of the circumstances,‖99 the
Court held that the plaintiffs had met their evidentiary burden,
showing that they had been ―effectively excluded‖ and were ―generally not permitted to enter into the political process in a reliable and
meaningful manner.‖100
When it came to the remedy, however, the Court made a bizarre
leap of logic. If the constitutional problem consisted of barriers to
participation, then we might expect the remedy to focus on how to
lower those barriers and integrate the plaintiff groups effectively into
the mainstream of political life in those jurisdictions. Instead, the
Court ordered the multimember districts broken up into singlemember districts in at least one of which the complaining minority
groups would, presumably, become local majorities.101 Somehow, the
Court suggested, this partitioning of aggrieved minority groups into
smaller districts that they could independently control would ―bring
the community into the full stream of political life of the county and
State.‖102 Yet partitioning is the antithesis of overcoming exclusion
from participation; it is in fact a different, and in some ways a more
extreme, form of exclusion: it takes the complaining group out of the
offending jurisdiction and creates a new one in which the group in
question no longer has to worry about—much less to engage and
work with—the larger group that had previously excluded it.103 Certainly, the Court gave no thought to the fact that partitioning the
electorate creates new minorities within the newly formed majorityminority districts, or whether the harm of exclusion from participation might now be shifted to such other groups.104
Since Regester, the solution of partitioning has been applied routinely in many contexts. Where at-large systems have been used for
discriminatory purposes, division of the multimember jurisdiction
into equipopulous districts has long been the Court‘s remedy of choice
98. Id. at 766.
99. Id. at 769.
100. Id. at 767.
101. See id. at 769.
102. Id.
103. See Kathryn Abrams, ―Raising Politics Up‖: Minority Political Participation and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1988). But see LANI GUINIER, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 82
(1994) (arguing that inclusion alone may be futile if it leads to token representation and consistent outvoting, and arguing for alternation in power as an alternative to partitioning).
104. Aleinikoff and Issacharoff call these groups ―filler people.‖ T. Alexander Aleinikoff
& Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 588 (1993). For a well-known example, see United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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in constitutional cases.105 It is also the Court‘s remedy of choice in cases arising under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The VRA, perhaps the most significant American civil rights legislation ever enacted, implements the Fifteenth Amendment‘s prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. Section 2(b) of the Act, using language lifted directly from the Supreme Court‘s opinion in White v. Regester, provides:
A violation . . . of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by [this statute] in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.106

The statute thus defines an offense in terms of harm to ―participation . . . in the political process.‖107 Yet in Thornburg v. Gingles
(1986),108 its leading decision on the treatment under the VRA of multimember districts, the Supreme Court ruled that the preferred remedy for denials of participation is not removal of barriers to participation within such districts, but the destruction of multimember districts by partitioning the electorate into single-member districts such
that the protected minority is awarded control of one or more of the
new districts.
The Court‘s habitual resort to partitioning might be perfectly coherent were it led to this remedy by some theory of representation or
of democratic process. In fact, however, it has no such theory, and
this has produced some significant, persistent problems in the jurisprudence. First, the Court‘s lack of an underlying theory leaves unanswered a host of important questions. For example, the act of partitioning the electorate into subgroups necessarily involves decisions
about who will have the ability to control an election district, and
consequently about who will obtain effective representation in the
legislature. Yet without a theory of representation we cannot know
who or what is properly represented in a legislature, and thus cannot
105. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
333 (1973); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551 (1972); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690,
692 (1971).
106. Id.
107. Id. A Senate Report accompanying the legislation listed numerous factors that
might help establish the requisite harm to political participation, including a history of
official discrimination in voting; the existence in the jurisdiction of racially polarized voting; the use of electoral procedures that enhance the opportunity for discrimination; denial
of access to candidate slating processes; depressed political participation on account of past
discrimination in education or employment; racial appeals during campaigns; and the lack
of election of minorities to office in the jurisdiction. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
44-45 (1986).
108. 478 U.S. at 50.
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make principled decisions about which ways of subdividing the electorate are appropriate and which are not.109
An example of how these kinds of problems can arise is afforded
by Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 (1969).110 That case
concerned the validity of a New York law that limited eligibility to
vote in school board elections to parents of school-age children and
those who owned or rented taxable property in the district.111 The
purpose of the law clearly was to confine the school board electorate
to those who had some direct or indirect stake in its activities—
parents had an interest in the education of their children, and owners and renters of taxable property had an interest in the activities of
the school board because it levied school taxes within the district.112
The plaintiff, who lived rent-free in his parents‘ house and was thus
ineligible under the statute to vote, claimed his right to vote had
been infringed.113 The Court agreed,114 but the basis and significance
of its ruling is unclear. It did not offer any theory (or if ―theory‖ is too
fancy a term, any ―account‖) of who might be entitled to representation on an elected legislative body, and on what basis. Nor did it suggest that universal suffrage is a constitutional default rule. Instead,
the Court ―express[ed] no opinion‖115 as to whether the state might
legitimately restrict the franchise to those who are most directly interested in or affected by governmental actions, but struck down the
statute on the ground that it did not advance with sufficient precision
the state‘s asserted justifications, whether or not they were constitutionally valid.116 The ruling thus clarifies nothing.
Another example is the eye-opening result in Holt Civic Club v.
City of Tuscaloosa (1978).117 Under Alabama law, cities were permitted to extend the reach of their laws beyond municipal boundaries to
unincorporated areas located up to three miles outside city limits.118
Tuscaloosa exercised this option to extend many of its ordinances and
regulations to the nearby town of Holt.119 Under the statute, however,
Tuscaloosa was not obliged to offer the residents of Holt an opportunity to vote for Tuscaloosa‘s city council or mayor.120 As a result,
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

REHFELD, supra note 30, at 199.
See 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 632.
See id. at 632-33.
See 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 62-63.
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Holt residents were subject to laws in the making of which they had
no voice—a kind of virtual representation soundly repudiated by the
American Revolution.121 The Court nevertheless upheld this governance arrangement on the ground that Holt residents did not live in
Tuscaloosa,122 once again failing to buttress its ruling with any account of who is entitled to representation on legislative bodies, and in
what circumstances. One might well ask, for example, why residents
of Holt, Alabama, were not entitled to representation on a city council
that made laws directly binding on them while Mr. Kramer was entitled to representation on a local school board that made laws directly
governing the behavior only of others. It may not be necessary for a
constitution to provide detailed answers to every question about representation that might arise, but to the extent there is slack in the
system, it seems important to know the range of discretion invested
in legislatures to define the basis of their own representation.123
A second problem arising from the Court‘s habitual resort to partitioning despite its lack of a theory of democratic practice or representation is what might be called ―partitioning anxiety.‖ Without any
underlying theory of democratically legitimate representation, partitioning is essentially unguided, and the only way corrections to existing arrangements can be made is ad hoc, based on distaste for particular representation schemes. This has led to occasional judicial
anxiety about the impact of partitioning.
A clear example of this is the Court‘s decisions in a line of cases
beginning with Shaw v. Reno (1993).124 As explained above, the VRA,
as construed by the Court, in some circumstances requires states to
partition the electorate so as to give blacks and other protected populations a substantial degree of control over an appropriate number of
election districts.125 States got the message, and proceeded to comply.126 Having set this pattern in motion, however, the Court soon began to exhibit a case of severe anxiety.
121. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (Harvard Univ. Press 4th ed.1967).
122. Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 70.
123. See James A. Gardner, How to Do Things with Boundaries: Redistricting and the
Construction of Politics, 11 ELECTION L.J. 399, 417-18 (2012) (arguing that constitutionalized norms of democracy can be adequately regulated by defining a range of permissible
choices, requiring jurisdictions to make explicit choices about institutional arrangements,
and then exercising judicial enforcement by requiring those jurisdictions to act consistently
with their publicly declared commitments).
124. 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993). See also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999);
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Lawyer v. Dep‘t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
125. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
126. See, e.g., QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, eds. 1994).
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Shaw v. Reno concerned the constitutionality of a tortuous district
drawn by North Carolina for the purpose of sweeping up black populations in different parts of the state in sufficient numbers to give
them political control of a congressional district.127 The state drew the
district for no purpose other than to comply with the VRA.128 Yet the
Court found the shape of the district too ―bizarre,‖129 and the state‘s
reliance on race as the operative criterion for partitioning voters too
single-minded, causing it to invalidate the district as racially discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause.130 In so doing, the Court
placed states in the impossible position of attempting to walk a fine
line, the location of which remained obscure: on one hand, a state violated the VRA if it did not try hard enough to provide racial minorities with districts they could control; on the other, a state violated the
Equal Protection Clause if it tried too hard.131
All this is a direct and predictable consequence of the Court‘s insistence that the electorate be partitioned coupled with its refusal to
supply any guidance as to what kind of representation a partitioned
electorate ought to enjoy. Having demanded the creation of majorityminority districts, the Court balked at the implications of its own requirement, and its instruction to states amounted more or less to the
following directive: partition, but not like this. The only thing the
Court has done since then to make things easier for states engaged in
redistricting is its recent invalidation of a significant provision of the
VRA in Shelby County v. Holder (2013).132 Following that ruling,
states need be much less fearful of liability under the VRA, leaving
them to fear realistically only liability under the Equal Protection
Clause, a more difficult kind of case for plaintiffs to prove up.133 Nevertheless, the ruling does nothing to clarify how states ought to draw
election districts.
But perhaps the most serious problem arising from the Court‘s
heavy reliance on partitioning to solve problems of democratic pro127. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633.
128. Id. at 634.
129. Id. at 644, 655-56.
130. See id. at 642-45.
131. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2510-11 (1997) (describing the Court‘s decisions as forcing states to
walk a line between permissible affirmative action and impermissible racial discrimination).
132. See 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
133. Proof of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of intentional
discrimination, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), whereas proof of a violation of
the VRA requires at most, in a section 2 case, a showing of disparate impact, without regard to intent. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74 (1986). Under Section 5, prior to
Shelby County, changes by a covered state to its electoral laws were presumed discriminatory until proven by the state to be racially benign or neutral. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539
U.S. 461 (2003).
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cess is that it leads political actors to focus not on the fairness or content of political processes within a district, but on acquisition of tactical control over the boundaries of districts.134 In the world the Court
has helped to create, democracy is constructed not only by processes
of voice and mutual engagement within a jurisdiction, but also by
manipulating who is in and who is out of that jurisdiction. The route
to success in politics thus often lies less in offering a set of normative
commitments attractive enough to appeal to voters than in sending
one‘s opponents into exile by partitioning them out of the territory.
This problem plagues American democracy. It manifests itself
most often in persistently contentious processes of redistricting in
which political actors contest for power unguided by transparent and
binding legal principles.135 Lacking constitutionally grounded standards they are required to respect, redistricting authorities typically
fall back on coarse imperatives of power and partisanship. Redistricting thus is treated not as an occasion to bring democratic practice
into conformity with democratic ideals—which remain unspecified—
but as an opportunity to cement temporary partisan advantage into
place for the next ten years until a new census is taken and the process repeats itself.
V. AVAILABILITY: THE UNGUIDED DEPLOYMENT OF
GENERIC INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
As explained above, the Court‘s reluctance to develop a constitutionally-grounded account of the norms that structure and guide
American democratic processes created a vacuum at the heart of its
jurisprudence of democratic practice, a vacuum that, inevitably, had
to be filled with something. The previous section demonstrated how
the Court filled this vacuum in part by falling back on habitual forms
of problem-solving by reflexively deploying partitioning of the electorate as the standard treatment for a host of democratic ills. This
part describes another way in which the Court filled the vacuum left
by its refusal to specify a constitutional theory of democratic practice:
by reaching for the handiest and most readily available tool— though
not necessarily the most appropriate one—to resolve constitutional
challenges to the democratic legal order. That tool was individual
rights.136
134. The title of a recent book by a prominent political scientist says it all. See CHARLES
S. BULLOCK III, REDISTRICTING: THE MOST POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN AMERICA (2010).
135. States and even electorates (in initiative states) have tried to shape the process by
providing some limited forms of normative guidance, but without much success. See Gardner, Representation without Party, supra note 22, at 894-98.
136. On the disadvantages of a rights-based approach compared to one based on constitutional structure in cases addressing the constitutionality of democratic practice and process, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
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A. The Reign of Equal Protection
For about two decades, the Court‘s main tool for resolving disputes
over democratic practices and processes was the Equal Protection
Clause. Following Baker v. Carr and subsequent one person, one vote
cases, the Court routinely turned to equal protection in dozens of cases involving challenges to franchise restrictions,137 malapportionment,138 restrictions on ballot access,139 regulation of political parties,140 and many other issues. Yet outside of cases involving obvious
racial discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause was not well suited to carry the burden of the Court‘s reliance.
The Equal Protection Clause is clearly useful in cases challenging
official racial discrimination in democratic processes because redressing racial discrimination is what the Clause was principally designed
to achieve. Moreover, the fact that principles of equality are generally
parasitic on underlying substantive norms—their application, in other words, depends upon the existence of an independently supplied
normative baseline141—does not pose a problem in cases of racial discrimination for the obvious reason that the Constitution itself clearly
and emphatically establishes such a normative baseline: purposeful
racial discrimination is not to be tolerated in any official endeavor.142
The Equal Protection Clause, however, is much less useful for resolving problems of democracy that do not present claims of racial
discrimination. Its limited suitability to resolving such claims is perhaps most clearly revealed by the awkward gyrations the Court was
forced to undergo simply to find the Clause applicable to the most
basic controversies involving voting. In these cases, what the Court
wanted was a constitutional right to vote. On its face, this presented
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1998); Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to
Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1345 (2001); Gerken, supra note 4, at 504, 506, 512, 516-17, 520; Fuentes-Rohwer,
supra note 87, at 1946; James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters – A Dissent, 64 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 435, 436 (2010); Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to
Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1293 (2011). Also, some scholars have suggested that rights can be
deployed in a way that puts them in the service of structural considerations. See Frederick
Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1803 (1999); Charles, supra note 4; Dawood, supra note 4. For a full-bore defense of
the use of rights to adjudicate election law issues, see HASEN, supra note 16.
137. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
138. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
139. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
140. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93-107 (1976) (per curiam).
141. See Westen, supra note 88. See also supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
142. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (purposeful discrimination required to
make out claim under Fourteenth Amendment); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.55 (1980) (same
for Fifteenth Amendment).
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a problem: the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant in any provision a right to vote in federal elections,143 and indeed it incorporates
as the criterion of eligibility to vote in federal elections whatever
standards states have chosen to adopt for eligibility to vote in their
own legislative elections.144 Thus, as the Court has said on more than
one occasion, ―the Constitution . . . does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one . . . .‖145
Still, a constitution may be found to confer rights by means other
than express enumeration.146 The Court might, for example, have inferred the existence of a right to vote from the structure and purpose
of the Constitution‘s many provisions establishing representative
democracy.147 Doing so, though, would presumably have forced the
Court to acknowledge that the Constitution implicitly establishes
some principles of democratic self-rule, something it has not wished
to do. To avoid doing so, the Court chose instead to find the right to
vote buried awkwardly in the Equal Protection Clause. It consequently ruled that although the U.S. Constitution does not oblige a
state to allow anyone in particular to vote, once a state chooses to
extend the franchise to anyone at all, the Equal Protection Clause
requires that individuals be permitted to participate in elections ―on
an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has
adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any
segment of the State‘s population.‖148 Thus, bizarrely, the right to
vote came to be lodged in a provision that does not speak of voting;
143. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874).
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XVII. See also James A.
Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A
Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 959-67 (1997).
145. Happersett, 88 U.S. at 178. Accord Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457
U.S. 1, 8 (1982).
146. This is the premise of the Ninth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
147. In a very early case, the Court appeared as though it might move in this direction.
In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court invalidated malapportionment of congressional districts on the basis of inferences drawn from a structural provision, Article
I, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which requires that members of the House be elected ―by the
People of the several States.‖ However, it immediately retreated from this turn to structure
in its next case, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), in which it invalidated malapportionment in state legislative districts on equal protection grounds. The only other significant decisions in the field that the Court has reached on structural grounds are U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), in which the Court relied on the Qualifications Clauses to invalidate state-imposed term limits on members of Congress; and Cook v.
Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001), in which the Court invalidated a state law requiring disparaging statements to be placed on the ballot next to the names of candidates who refused
actively to pursue a federal constitutional amendment to impose term limits on members of
Congress. In the latter ruling, the Court relied on implicit structural conceptions of proper
representation and legislative judgment. Gralike, 531 U.S. at 510.
148. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973). Accord
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (―[A] citizen has a constitutionally protected
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.‖).
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does not confer on its own a right to vote; and cannot itself supply a
normative decision principle for resolving disputes about the proper
extent of the right to vote.
This latter problem, at least, could have been solved were the
Court willing to supply a principle of decision by extracting from the
Constitution some theory about what the vote is for and why, and in
what circumstances, citizens are entitled to have it. As we have seen,
however, this is precisely what the Court declines to do. As a result,
equal protection analysis in the area of voting rights becomes unmoored and haphazard as the Court searches for, or lurches between,
principles adequate to resolve its cases.
In no subfield of election law has this problem more thoroughly
crippled the Court‘s decision making capacity than in the field of redistricting, an area that presents perhaps the most pressing problems in all of American democratic practice. When redistricting raises issues of racial discrimination, the Court‘s tools for dealing with it
are more than adequate.149 Difficulties arise in handling a much more
widespread problem, the problem of partisan gerrymandering, in
which redistricting is performed so as to provide one party with an
outsized and undeserved advantage over its opponents.150 The Court‘s
attempt to handle this problem by resort to principles of equal protection has been a spectacular failure.
On three occasions in the last thirty years the Court has tried and
failed to identify a constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause for adjudicating the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.151 Its failure is directly traceable to the Court‘s deployment of equal protection without an underlying theory to identify a
baseline of proper representation, departure from which can therefore be understood as illicit gerrymandering.152 Justice Kennedy, who
cast the deciding vote in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004),153 admitted this
frankly in his opinion:
149. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments both provide strong proscriptions and
remedies. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339, 341-42 (1960).
150. To the extent that members of the Court have been able even to settle on a definition of the problem, they have defined it, for example, as conferring on the dominant party
a degree of power that is ―excessive,‖ League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399, 463 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), or ―too much‖
in relation to its fair or appropriate share, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 344 (2004)
(Souter, J., dissenting), or as the ―continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process,‖ Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (White, J., for a four-justice plurality).
151. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 404; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305;
Davis, 478 U.S. at 110.
152. Gerken, supra note 4, at 506-07; Gerken, supra note 7, at 414, 420.
153. 541 U.S. 267.
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Because there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of
fairness in districting, we have no basis on which to define clear,
manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the
particular burden a given partisan classification imposes on representational rights. Suitable standards for measuring this burden,
however, are critical to our intervention.154

He went on to issue an earnest appeal for help in identifying an appropriate baseline:
That no such standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future. Where important
rights are involved, the impossibility of full analytical satisfaction
is reason to err on the side of caution. . . . This possibility suggests
that in another case a standard might emerge that suitably demonstrates how an apportionment‘s de facto incorporation of partisan
classifications burdens rights of fair and effective representation.155

This is as far as the Court has ever gotten in a partisan gerrymandering case, and consequently legislatures engaged in the task of redistricting have little reason to fear effective judicial enforcement of
any constitutional prohibition on gerrymandering.
B. The Empire of the First Amendment
By the mid-1970s, the Court began to find that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments no longer reliably supplied decision rules
for every kind of case dealing with democratic practice and process
that the Court was willing to accept. Consequently, if the Court was
to continue to adjudicate such cases by deploying off-the-shelf, readily available individual rights, it would have to import some other
right into the democratic arena. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976),156 the
Court turned decisively to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. In Buckley, the Court invoked the First Amendment
to determine the constitutional validity of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the most comprehensive piece of federal campaign finance
regulation ever enacted, invalidating numerous portions of the Act in
large part on the ground that they unduly impaired constitutionally
protected speech.157 Not long after, in Anderson v. Celebrezze
(1983),158 a case challenging state rules restricting access of independent presidential candidates to the election ballot, the Court took
the significant step of repudiating the Equal Protection Clause as its
main workhorse in ballot access cases. Instead, the Court announced
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 307-08.
Id. at 311-12.
424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 19-22, 50, 54, 58.
460 U.S. 780, 786-87 n.7 (1983).
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without explanation that it would thenceforth analyze ballot access
restrictions under the First Amendment right of freedom of association, a second-order right derived by implication from the freedom of
speech.159 The Court went on in Anderson to invalidate the restriction
at issue on the ground that it burdened constitutionally protected
association between candidates and their supporters.160
In subsequent cases, the Court has invoked the First Amendment
to adjudicate nearly every kind of dispute involving regulation of the
democratic process. It has deployed the First Amendment not only in
cases revolving around campaign speech, campaign finance, and ballot access, but also in cases dealing with restrictions on voting,161 political parties,162 primary elections,163 and election integrity.164 Some
justices have suggested that even partisan gerrymandering cases
would be more tractable if handled under the First Amendment.165 In
fact, so versatile has the Court found the First Amendment that it
has begun to approach its democracy cases as though the First
Amendment is the only provision in the entire Constitution of the
slightest relevance to the system of representative democracy it institutionalizes. This odd approach might be harmless if the Court‘s resort to the First Amendment represented merely some kind of wellunderstood judicial synecdoche, in which the First Amendment is invoked as a kind of short-hand reference to the entirety of the constitutional scheme. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The Court‘s understanding has become close to literal; the First Amendment has
become for the Court essentially a one-provision constitution, complete in itself, capable of solving any and every problem of democracy
for which judicial review may be had.
This approach has been costly, and the main casualty has been
the First Amendment, which has in these cases been stretched beyond all recognition. Although it is indisputably handy, dangling tantalizingly at the top of the Bill of Rights like a fly before a trout, freedom of speech simply is not an instrument well-suited to the work of

159. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
160. Id. at 792-95, 806.
161. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992).
162. See Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233 (1989).
163. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones,
530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
164. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
165. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314-15 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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adjudicating many of the complex questions that arise concerning
democratic practice and procedure.166
The most notable example of the inadequacy of the right to free
speech to handle problems for which it has been deployed is the area
of campaign finance. In a series of cases beginning with Buckley v.
Valeo (1976)167 and continuing through the Court‘s recent decisions in
Citizens United v. FEC (2010)168 and McCutcheon v. FEC (2014),169
the Court has deployed the freedom of speech to decide the constitutionality of laws that restrict the giving and spending of money in
connection with election campaigns for public office. In so doing, the
Court has afforded the same degree of First Amendment protection to
giving and spending money in election campaigns as it does to campaign speech itself; in the Court‘s jurisprudence, there is no constitutionally significant difference between political spending and political
speaking.170
The Court‘s indiscriminate use of the First Amendment has been
harshly criticized for decades,171 and there is no need to rehearse that
criticism here. Suffice it to say that money is tied to speech only
loosely, and that equating the regulation of money spent to buy
speech with regulation of the speech itself proves far too much and
thus bites far too deeply into democratically legitimate and justifiable
regulatory regimes.172 Furthermore, a crucially important component
of the First Amendment doctrine that the Court imported into the
arena of democratic practice is a long-standing judicial tradition of
very nearly absolute opposition to the regulation of fully protected
forms of speech.173 As a result, the Court‘s importation into the democracy arena of a pure free speech regime, unmodified to suit the
context, has led, predictably, to shockingly deregulatory results.
166. See sources cited supra note 136, arguing for the superiority of a structural approach, or at least an approach to rights that places them in the service of structural
considerations.
167. 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam).
168. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
169. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441, 1448 (2014).
170. For a classic statement of this view, see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
171. A small but suggestive collection of such critiques may be found in GARDNER &
CHARLES, supra note 55, at 684-91.
172. This objection was immediately raised in Buckley itself by Justice White. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262-64 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. This impulse takes the form of application of ―strict scrutiny,‖ the highest possible
standard of constitutional judicial review, to cases regulating speech on the basis of their
content. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-42 (1994); N.Y. Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). On the inappropriate application of an absolutist
First Amendment approach in campaign finance cases, see James A. Gardner, AntiRegulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery
Slope, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 673 (2011).
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Thus, in Buckley, the Court gutted the Federal Election Campaign
Act by invalidating nearly every limitation on campaign spending
contained in the Act.174 It continued to invalidate regulatory limitations on political spending in a long series of cases,175 and in some
instances invalidated limitations on campaign contributions to candidates as well.176 In its 2010 decision in Citizens United, the Court
shocked observers by invalidating a century-old prohibition on direct
political spending by corporations.177
Critical to the Court‘s ruling in these cases is its rejection in Buckley of the basic legitimacy of one of Congress‘s principal reasons for
enacting restrictions on campaign spending: to redress inequality in
political influence between the rich and the poor,178 an interest the
Court deemed ―wholly foreign to the First Amendment.‖179 As a matter of run-of-the-mill First Amendment free speech doctrine, government attempts to orchestrate a fair balance of views expressed in
everyday discourse in civil society might well be viewed with extreme
skepticism.180 Speech made in the course of democratic processes intended to constitute a binding expression of the popular will, however, is no ordinary speech,181 and the Court‘s importation into this
arena of an existing, off-the-shelf First Amendment regime seems
effectively to have blinded the Court to extremely significant differences in context—differences of goals, stakes, complexity, and countervailing values.182
174. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59.
175. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); FEC v. Nat‘l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S.
480 (1985); First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
176. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
177. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
178. See GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 55, at 681-83, and sources cited therein.
179. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
180. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Brandenberg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-84 (1964).
181. See, e.g., DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL
PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 115 (2002) (―[E]lections and the campaigns leading up to
them may be considered more a part of government than a part of politics that influences
government. The standards that control the conduct of elections should therefore be determined more by collective decision than by individual choice.‖). To similar effect, see Dennis
F. Thompson, Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal Properties of the Electoral Process in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 51, 60-62 (2004); Saul Zipkin, The
Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533,
575-76 (2010).
182. For an overview, see GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 55, at 670-78. A comprehensive account of the best reasons for and against campaign finance restrictions may be
found in JACOB ROWBOTTOM, DEMOCRACY DISTORTED: WEALTH, INFLUENCE AND
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2010). An alternative and more nuanced approach is that of the
Supreme Court of Canada, which has found the constitutional protection of democracy to
embody numerous distinct values which are capable in many circumstances of coming into
conflict. See Dawood, supra note 6, at 252-57.
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Nor is First Amendment doctrine particularly well-suited to deal
with other issues to which the Court has applied it. Consider, for example, the Court‘s handling of questions of ballot access, which arise
when laws regulate the conditions under which candidates may have
their names placed on the election ballot. For three decades, the
Court has adjudicated such cases under the First Amendment right
of association, evaluating ballot access rules in terms of the degree to
which they burden association between candidates and their followers.183 There are many ways to think about ballot access. One might
plausibly say that what is at stake in ballot access cases is presenting
voters with an appropriate and meaningful range of choices;184 or that
governmental restrictions on ballot access raise issues of incumbent
self-protection or partisan self-dealing;185 or that ballot access restrictions potentially limit the optimal degree of political competition.186 But to proceed as though the only constitutionally relevant
question concerns the ability of candidates and their supporters to
associate is downright strange. Enjoyment of association with others
may be a worthwhile benefit of group political participation, but it is
not the main goal, nor does the printing of a candidate‘s name on the
ballot in any meaningful way enhance the quantity or quality of association between the candidate and his or her supporters.187 A more
plausible explanation for why the Court analyzes ballot access in these terms, then, is its desire to make use of a readily available, off-theshelf right, in lieu of thinking about new or alternative frameworks
to apply in such cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The phrase ―constitutional jurisprudence‖ generally conjures up
the image of a court working hard to develop a versatile and internally coherent body of doctrine that furnishes appealing solutions to
pressing legal problems while bringing constitutional text and purpose into harmonious alignment with judicial implementation. If so,
then one is hard-pressed to apply the term to the incoherent and
haphazard body of law developed by the U.S. Supreme Court to adjudicate problems of democratic practice and process. To the extent the
183. Since, that is, its decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). The
Court has continued to rely on the First Amendment in ballot access cases. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
184. See, e.g., AUSTIN RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT:
ITS ORIGINS AND PRESENT STATE (1954) (setting out a theory of democratic accountability
based on active and meaningful party competition).
185. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 136, at 683-87.
186. See id.
187. For a skeptical view of this proposition, see Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U.S. 208, 235 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court can be said to have such a jurisprudence at all, it is a largely
accidental one that the Court has stumbled into through habit, the
vagaries of doctrinal availability, and a susceptibility to pathdependent decision making, rather than one that has been deliberately
crafted through the application of judicial imagination and diligence.
What is required, clearly, is for the Court to set aside its squeamishness about ―political theory‖ and do in the area of democratic politics precisely what it has done in other areas of constitutional structure, such as federalism and the horizontal separation of powers: develop a theory of what the Constitution is trying to do and how it
strives to go about it. There is no reason why the Court cannot derive
from the Constitution‘s structural provisions, underlying principles,
and historic democratic commitments an account of the nature and
appropriate processes of representative democracy. That would be a
useful first step in a much-needed program to undo the damage
caused by the Court‘s failure to provide a sensible foundation for judicial review in this singularly important area of constitutional law.

